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1 A  singular  collection  of  publications  accompanies  the  exhibition  Aux  origines  de
l’abstraction 1800-1914, organized at the Musée d’Orsay by Pascal Rousseau with the help of
Arnaud Pierre,  Julie  Ramos,  and  Georges  Roque.  Two of  them fit  perfectly  with  the
worksite  opened  up  by  the  exhibition  catalogue,  itself  a  constellation  of  different
readings of the scientific and synaesthetic origins of abstraction. One is the first French
translation of the third part of Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s Farbenlehre (1810), Matériaux
pour  l’histoire  de  la  théorie  des  couleurs,  in  the  excellent  translation  by  Maurice  Elie,
preceded by a subtle and illuminating preface by Eliane Escoubas.  The second is  the
catalogue of the works of Frantisek Kupka–central figure in the d’Orsay show–belonging
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to the collections of the National Museum of Modern Art, outstandingly inventoried by
Brigitte Leal for the “extra muros” Pompidou Centre exhibition. If these two publications
stem from the establishment of sources and constitute research instruments, two others
propose  theoretical  interpretations  of  early  abstract  works.  G.  Roque  answers  the
question: What is Abstraction? and Philippe Sers augments his Kandinsky. Philosophie de l’art
abstrait : peinture, poésie, scénographie, probably as a tribute to Anatole Kopp, “to all those
who have believed, still do believe, and will believe in modernity not as a style, but as a
cause”.
2 “Belief”, as we know, often goes hand in hand with regret for an allegedly glorious past,
with, as a corollary, a harsh criticism of the present, deemed to be more “ephemeral”
than past presents: this is the case of P. Sers. Our present, for him, is prey to the laws of
internationalization, and devoid of utopia, and, when all is said and done, impure: “The
great broom of history has unfortunately not yet started its cleaning job in our day and
age” (p. 40). But isn’t the problem the fact that each time history has wanted to take up
its broom, it was to do away with itself? Is it possible, today, to invoke something like a
“spring clean”, as Kandinsky and his Expressionist friends did on the eve of 1914? Not
even a “philosophy of abstract art” can free itself from historicity, its own as much as
that of its object. P. Sers defends his belief proudly–and with a fanaticism that is even
more disputable than that of the moderns, because it is late in coming (so has nothing
happened since?). His understanding of the abstract, oriental, Christian, even Platonic
image (it  all  comes to the same thing in his  book)  has  as  its  conceptual  matrix the
Christian icon; this is probably why the image has a saving mission for the author. P.
Sers’s belief is set forth at times in the mode of pure assertiveness (the onlooker must
blend in a Kandinsky picture, and forget himself in order to “see the light”, p. 33), and at
others  through  the  simple  identification  of  the  author  with  his  object  (Kandinsky’s
thinking paraphrased, the painter’s submission borrowed without inverted commas, p.
43). P. Sers presents his method like a hermeneutic exercise, but he seems to overlook the
fact that this latter has proceeded, from Friedrich Schleiermacher at least, from the loss
of  the immediacy of  sense and from the tension of  the interpretations–because it  is
merely the fruit of our “ephemeral” and controversial day and age. He also defends just
as much the infallibility of his “iconic hermeneutics” and condemns semiotics which, by
mimetic contagion, is a science that is as prosaic as its primary object: language–far too
poor when compared with the image (p. 15).
3 G. Roque adopts a stance that is the diametric opposite: for him, semiotics,  a science
beyond contingencies, is endowed with an interpretative neutrality which is every bit a
match  for  the  hard  sciences.  Having  all  the  qualities  of  hermeneutic  and  formalist
methods, and none of their shortcomings, semiotics is both the middle way and the fast
lane combined for gaining access to the meaning of abstraction (p. 411 ff.). The author’s
concern with rigour is apt, but it cannot be shared when it takes on the overtones of a
certain return to order. “Art historians”, as G. Roque condescendingly labels those who
studied abstraction before him, have nevertheless helped to specify, be it by means of
formalism or hermeneutics, some of the sources of abstraction which are still valid. To
sum up, one gets the feeling that spiritualism would make abstraction ashamed–and be its
shame: how, otherwise, are we to comprehend G. Roque’s effort, in his contribution to the
d’Orsay  catalogue,  to  prove  the  chronological  and,  all  of  a  sudden,  ontological,
antecedence of scientific statements about spiritualist theses? (p. 58). Human feats and
acts have no need of “pure” motifs,  but are in most cases the outcome of competing
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motifs. Does not theosophy owe its success, in the 19th century, to the answers it gave to
the “interpretative malaise” stirred up by images of science? (p. 58-59). Or alternatively,
has it not quite simply sought to fill in the same semantic and ontological void that was
also filled by belief in science?
4 The contributions by P. Rousseau, A. Pierre, J. Ramos and Marcella Lista to the d’Orsay
catalogue do not champion any kind of methodological exclusivism, while at the same
time adopting a micro-historic method focused on the scientific and scientistic sources of
abstraction. The last section of this catalogue is less focused, however, on these sources,
and more on synaesthesia:  J.  Ramos,  and,  even more so,  M. Lista simultaneously and
subtly pull the different threads (aesthetic, formal, ideological and scientific) which have
contributed to the formation of romantic imitation and early abstractions. 
P. Rousseau and A. Pierre, both rigorous and precise, once more open up the great site of
reflection and research: the role of the body, true terrain of “aesthetic reception”, as
much for the artists as for the scientific aesthetic of the 19th century.
5 Taken overall, this catalogue prompts two observations. The first has to do with a certain
interdisciplinarity:  if  French art history is in the process of discovering the immense
scientific laboratory of the 19th century, other disciplines such as the history of medicine,
political history and the history of science have been exploring this field for a long time.
Likewise, it would have been nice to have a less specific exploration of the links between
science and spiritualism, which were so close during the period in question. The authors’
thesis, whereby science is one of the sources of abstraction, and not the only one, would
be on a firmer footing as a result: for it is true that, rather than belief or atheism, albeit
enlightened, it is a form of agnosticism that art history needs.
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